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The past 25 years have seen a rapid growth of knowledge about brain mechanisms
involved in visual mental imagery. These advances have largely been made
independently of the long history of philosophical – and even psychological – reckoning
with imagery and its parent concept ‘imagination’. We suggest that the view from
these empirical findings can be widened by an appreciation of imagination’s intellectual
history, and we seek to show how that history both created the conditions for –
and presents challenges to – the scientific endeavor. We focus on the neuroscientific
literature’s most commonly used task – imagining a concrete object – and, after
sketching what is known of the neurobiological mechanisms involved, we examine the
same basic act of imagining from the perspective of several key positions in the history
of philosophy and psychology. We present positions that, firstly, contextualize and
inform the neuroscientific account, and secondly, pose conceptual and methodological
challenges to the scientific analysis of imagery. We conclude by reflecting on the
intellectual history of visualization in the light of contemporary science, and the extent to
which such science may resolve long-standing theoretical debates.
Keywords: visual imagery, fMRI, imagination, philosophy of mind, history of philosophy, history of psychology
INTRODUCTION
Recent methodological developments have overcome longstanding obstacles to enable direct
investigation of the neurobiology of mental imagery (Pearson et al., 2015). Technologies such
as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET)
have fed the formation of a significant body of knowledge about visual mental imagery’s neural
underpinnings. Researchers have shown, for example, that visualizing draws on many – but not
all – of the same mechanisms as visual perception. Meanwhile, the nature and role of imagery
has been a matter of keen philosophical interest since antiquity. By setting out this history, the
following aims to inform and challenge the neuroscientific approach to visual mental imagery. It
also aims to draw out the implications of the neuroscientific findings for researchers in other fields.
Even a cursory glance reveals how contested a capacity the ‘mind’s eye’ has been.
We see, for example, that whereas Plato held the imagination in low regard, Aristotle
claimed that the images produced by the imagination or phantasia are essential to thought:
“The soul never thinks without a phantasma”. Aristotle’s (1984, 431a) views of the
imagination and imagery pervaded thinking on the subject through the medieval period until
Descartes (1985) in the 17th-century, who placed imaginings with sensations, on the side
of the body – “a special way of thinking for material things” (Descartes, 1985, 6:37) –
and so open to doubt. Kant, by contrast, re-iterated the centrality of the imagination
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to cognition, and introduced the link to creativity that would
be extolled by the Romantic poets of the 19th-century. While
for Kant the workings of the imagination were essentially
mysterious – “arts concealed in the depths of the human soul”
(Kant, 1998, p. 273) – Galton’s (1880) questionnaire on visualizing
and other allied activities introduced the possibility that acts
of imagining could be quantified and examined using modern
scientific techniques: experimental psychology developed into
a distinct academic discipline with introspection at its center.
Mid-twentieth-century behaviorism threw out imagination and
imagery as scientifically inadmissible; for its founder J. B.
Watson, mental images were ultimately reducible to “motor
habits in the larynx”. Cognitive psychology refocussed scientific
attention on imagery with the development of experiments
by Alan Paivio, Roger Shepard, Stephen Kosslyn, and others,
which suggested aspects of thought that critically depended
on mental phenomena such as imagery. Although in the
20th-century philosophers of both ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’
persuasion developed a host of models and theories about
the imagination’s working, the empirical study of imagining
took a decisive turn in the 1990s, with the development of
neuroimaging technologies that make the brain’s processes
visible.
Broadly, the resulting studies show that during visual imagery
there is activation of a subset of the posterior (occipital and
temporal) regions which are also engaged by visual perception –
as shown by, for example, Kosslyn et al. (1993, 1997). Unlike
perception, however, visual imagery coincides primarily with
activation of more anterior (frontal and parietal) regions involved
in executive function and attention (see Ishai et al., 2000), in
keeping with its complex relationship with working memory.
For many scientists, such as Behrmann (2000) and Kosslyn
et al. (2001), these and other findings have provided definitive
answers to questions that millennia of philosophical discussion
about the imagination could only pose – around such issues
as its relationship to perception and memory, how images are
generated, even what images are.
Our aim here, however, is to bridge the gap between this new
knowledge and the old by showing that the questions addressed
by neuroscientific studies have a pre-neuroscientific past that
offers to expand the conceptual and contextual horizon of the
neuroscientific findings. Accordingly, we will set out how this
intellectual history both created the conditions for – and presents
challenges to – the scientific endeavor (Figure 1).
APPROACH
Although many people can experience imagery in all sense
modalities (aural, tactile, olfactory, and so on), as well as imagine
without a sensory component (for example in ‘propositional’
imagining, that such-and-such is the case) our focus here is
on the most commonly studied sense modality, which is the
visual. Even with this limitation in place, the first methodological
issue confronting us is one of scope: how can we hope to
negotiate the two-and-a-half millennia of thought, from theology
to philosophy and esthetics, in which some model or theory of the
visual imagination has played a role? The prospect is daunting –
but the neuroscientific literature itself suggests a method.
Functional imaging studies of the visual imagination give
participants mental exercises or tasks to carry out while being
scanned. The tasks are various, ranging from imagining specified
times on analog clock-faces, then judging the acute angle between
the hands (Formisano et al., 2002), to visualizing grids and
‘superimposing’ figures on top (Knauff et al., 2000). But the task
that occurs most often is to imagine a concrete object, with the
instruction delivered either aurally or in writing. In one study,
for example, “Two sets of aurally presented nouns ‘concrete’ vs
‘abstract’ were used. . . . Subjects were instructed to imagine the
appearance of the named object during the concrete condition
and to listen passively to the words during the abstract condition”
(D’Esposito et al., 1997, p. 727). In another, “[s]ubjects were
stimulated with a set of 96 . . . auditory short sentences belonging
to . . . different sensory modalities (Belardinelli et al., 2009,
p. 191). The task is also central to the experimental paradigms
of Ishai et al. (2000), Handy et al. (2004), Amedi et al. (2005),
Gardini et al. (2009), and Daselaar et al. (2010). While imagining
can be both willed and unwilled (Pearson and Westbrook, 2015),
these tasks, it is important to note, demand a voluntary act of
imagining.
If the picturing of a concrete object is a slim extraction from the
imagination’s wide conceptual array, it is exactly its narrowness
that makes it a suitable ‘test case’, a means by which to cut
into imagination’s intellectual history and extract comparable and
contrastive instances. This leads to our other methodological
issue, which concerns the criteria on which those instances are
selected. Loosely following Dennett’s (1981) description of the
“iconophile” viewpoint, the theories and models of visualization
that inform contemporary scientific analysis are taken to do so
because they grant ‘a reality’ to the visual imagination, contending
that (1) images have an important role in cognition, and (2) images
are either directly or indirectly observable. We consider these in
the first part of the paper. In the second part of the paper we
turn to theories of “iconophobes” that pose a challenge to this
scientific endeavor – questioning the cognitive importance of
imagery, even the existence of mental images, as well as their
scientific legitimacy.
Before exploring the first category of imagery theories, we will
now sketch a neuroscientific account of picturing a concrete object.
The account will draw on and amalgamate details from several
studies that deal with this particular form of imagining, pointing
to both the neural mechanisms involved, and to the methods used
to explore them. Our emphasis of brain imaging in this account
does not imply that it is the only fruitful approach to studying the
neurological basis of visual imagery: much can be also be learned,
for example, from studies of brain injury (see Farah, 1984).
NEURO-IMAGING VISUAL IMAGINATION
This account begins with a healthy, right-handed, 33-year old
male (Knauff et al., 2000’s median test-participant) lying face-
up in the MRI machine, with headphones over his ears. Doing
his best not to move, as he has been instructed, he checks with
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FIGURE 1 | Indicative chronology of key figures and key works.
himself that he knows what to do: listen to each phrase, create a
mental image of its content and hold onto that image until you hear
the next phrase. After a last word from an assistant, who exits to
a side room, the scanner begins to hum around the participant
and the first phrase is piped through his headphones, a strangely
genderless voice (as Belardinelli et al., 2009 have it) instructing
him to visualize a candle. In a moment, another follows, to
visualize a chair – but for those few seconds he thinks of a candle
(white wax, maybe two fists high, the wick lit). The neural activity
that accompanies those thoughts demand oxygenated blood,
which is what the scanner detects; neural activity will be inferred
from the recordings (this is not to suggest it is a clear path of
inference from magnetization to blood oxygen to neural activity:
see Buxton, 2009 for an account of the extensive statistical and
filtering procedures necessary to overcome the ‘noise’ of the scan
and reveal areas of significant activation).
Those inferences will tell us that, when the participant pictures
the candle, activity increases in a distributed network of regions
across all of his brain. Assemblies of cells in the temporal
lobe, involved in attributing and storing information about the
appearance of objects (see Fletcher et al., 1995; D’Esposito et al.,
1997; Ishai et al., 2000), in turn excite a cascade of neurons in the
visual cortices of the occipital lobes. This is roughly a reversal of
what happens in perception [as James (1890/1981) was among the
first to suggest], where information received in the visual areas of
the occipital lobe is projected to visual association areas.
The candle, meanwhile, does not simply ‘appear to’ the
participant. He is ‘bringing it to mind’, with all the effort of
will that the expression suggests. His task, after all, is to listen
to the phrase, create a mental image and hold onto that image.
Generating and maintaining the candle in his mind’s eye depends
on activity in the brain’s other two lobes. The active regions
form a ‘parieto-frontal’ network that is implicated in ‘top–down’
control – the top–down control in this case consisting in the
attention required to form and hold onto the mental image [if
attention is indeed a requirement, and not an effect of the task, as
Anderson (2011) proposes].
Because external stimulus induces stronger neural activity
than visual imagery (see Kreiman et al., 2000), external stimulus
tends to ‘win the battle’ for conscious awareness. Another type
of top-down modulation may thus be required to bring the
candle image to awareness: the suppression of incoming visual
information (Jacob et al., 2015). Moreover, without this – which
would seem to be achieved by inhibiting the early visual cortex
(Kaas et al., 2010) – there is a risk that imagery with an internal
source might be mistaken for a percept with an external source,
and hallucination would ensue (Frith and Done, 1988); the
famous ‘Perky effect’, where external input is misconstrued to
be part of mental imagery (Perky, 1910, but see also recent
psychophysical replications by, e.g., Bona et al., 2013; Saad and
Silvanto, 2013), describes the opposite situation.
This, then, is the knowledge gained (after the writing up,
publication, the metanalytic averaging of activation foci, and
so on) when the study of imagining takes a technologically
sophisticated empirical turn. The neuroimaging results
tentatively suggest that visualizing a candle depends on
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 April 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 515
fpsyg-07-00515 April 15, 2016 Time: 15:51 # 4
MacKisack et al. Prehistory of Imagery Science
activity across several brain regions: networks based in the
parietal and frontal lobes generate and maintain an image which
is represented in the temporal lobes, themselves back-projecting
information into occipital areas.
With this indicative summary in place, and in pursuit of
the conceptual and practical possibility of a (neuro-)scientific
engagement with visual imagination, we will now jump backward
two-and-a-half millennia to the Western intellectual tradition’s
primordial account of imagining.
FOUNDATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC
ENGAGEMENT WITH VISUAL
IMAGINATION
Classical Natural Philosophy
Plato’s is arguably the first truly philosophical – as opposed
to mythological – account of the imagination in the Western
tradition. Before Plato, “there was no comprehensive view of the
relation of matter to spirit, of the outer to the inner, necessary for
an adequate concept of the nature and function of “phantasy”’
(Bundy, 1927, p. 18). In Plato’s system, however, the imagination
holds a lowly position: for him, all images are mere copies of
things that are themselves copies of divine eternal forms (Republic
509 d). Besides – or rather because of – this broad condemnation,
Plato makes little distinction between ‘physical’ images, both
natural and fabricated, and what would now be called mental
images.
Plato (1997, p. 191c,d) does suggest – albeit metaphorically –
what we might now call a ‘cognitive’ model of the imagination. In
the Theaetetus it is suggested that memory might be analogous to
a block of wax into which our perceptions and thoughts stamp
impressions; in Philebus, Socrates declares that there is a “sort
of painter in the soul” who “draws in the mind the images of
things said”. The painter, it should be noted, merely follows
the scribe responsible for the discursive train of thought, the
logos (Plato, 1997, 39b). For Plato (1997, 511c), the images are
incidental ‘epiphenomena’, and moreover, a low kind of thinking:
the philosopher uses no ‘object of sense’ but only ‘pure ideas
moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas’. For
Aristotle, who will not only endorse these models but literalize
the metaphors into an “organic” psychological theory (Agamben,
1992, p. 75), reasoning is also the manipulation of ideas; but since
for Aristotle, “ideas are not derived from a supersensible realm,
either by direct intuition or through the soul’s reminiscences
of the ideas it knew in heaven before its incarnation, but by
abstraction from the sensible world itself ” (Cocking, 1991, p. 18),
images become the essential intermediary between perception
and conception. To understand Aristotle’s notion of what it
means to imagine – specifically, to picture a concrete object – it
is first necessary to appreciate how in his schema one perceives an
object.
Aristotle’s perceptual theory is dependant on a conceptual
framework of ‘hylomorphism’ – literally, “matter-formism”. All
things, natural and artifactual, consist of matter and form. Matter
is that of which a thing is made, and form is that which makes
a thing belong to a particular class of things. On this view wax,
wick, and fire are the matter of a candle; the shape – wax vertically
arranged, wick running through its center, flame at the top – is
that by which the matter is ‘enformed’, and by which we know it
to be a candle.
Now, the object-world, for Aristotle, is not static. Things do
not sit waiting to be perceived. The forms of objects actually
emanate from the objects, in ‘movements’ initiated by the
objects themselves. An object is sensed when its emanated form
impinges on the person’s sense organ and causes the organ to
take on the form of the sensed object: when the sense-organ
“has been acted upon, it is similar and has the same character
as the sensible object” (Aristotle, 1984, 418a3–6). The matter,
meanwhile, remains with the object. The analogy (borrowed from
Plato) is of a signet ring’s impression in wax: only the shape of
the ring is imprinted, not the metal (Aristotle, 1984, 459b25–32).
This imprinting is a movement, with momentum: the imprint is
sent through the blood vessels to the sensus communis, the central
perceptual organ in the region of the heart, which binds the
imprints from the various senses into a coherent spatio-temporal
perception.
Veridical perception occurs when an imprint is sent on a clear,
uninterrupted trajectory to the central sense organ; “[w]hen one
thing has been set in motion,” however, “another thing may be
moved by it” (Aristotle, 1984, 428b10–11). The movement of
sensation, that is, can give rise to further movements, and this
is the movement called phantasia. While the sensus communis
integrates sensory experiences into meaningful perceptions in the
presence of the object, the phantasia takes that initial movement
begun by sensation, and in the absence of the thing perceived
produces phantasmata: derivatives of sensation, “necessarily
similar in character to the sensation itself ” (Aristotle, 1984,
428b12), but a side-effect, a knock-on effect, an echo. Picturing
a candle, then, would in Aristotle’s account involve movements
started by candles themselves. Leaving behind the wax, wick,
and flame of their matter, the candles’ sensible forms would
have impressed themselves upon the person’s eyes, in turn
sending candle-forms along the blood vessels to the heart, before
ricocheting off their trajectory to be stored in the heart’s wall
(1984, 450a32–b11) in preparation for the phantasia to put them
in motion once again.
That the motion starts within the person – that the candle is
voluntarily pictured – is important: it marks off the one picturing
as human. All animals have phantasmata, but deliberative
phantasmata are confined to those who are able to argue, or
those that are “calculative” (Aristotle, 1984, 450a32–b11); the
phantasmata of the lower animals can only ever be involuntary.
However, even voluntary phantasia, which is like making or
calling up a picture (Aristotle, 1984, 427b 20), is not a creative
act: nothing novel or original is generated. As Alan White has
pointed out, although phantasmata can be called up whenever we
wish, Aristotle “lays little stress on its use to envisage possibilities
other than the actual” (White, 1990, p. 9). Aristotle’s deliberative
imagination is concerned with planning, not with counter-factual
possibilities.
The kind of picturing just described, we should note
in summary, is only one of many roles performed by
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Aristotelian phantasmata: “the soul”, in fact, “never thinks
without a phantasma" [Aristotle, 1984, 431a 15–20]. They figure
in decision-making as much as dreams, hallucinations, and
recollections; they are as important to desire and motivation (e.g.,
Aristotle, 1984, 431a) as they are to communication (Aristotle,
1984, 16a 5–9). Such a universality may, from a modern
standpoint, appear unlikely, even alien – but it has a striking
contemporary resonance, as we will see in the Conclusion.
Medieval Philosophy
Where Aristotelianism became the dominant philosophy of
Western Christendom, Aristotle’s model of the imagination and
views about imagery came to permeate thinking on the subject
well into the medieval period. The dominant figure of medieval
scholasticism (which held that all knowledge had already been
recorded in the writings of church theologians and the Greek
and Roman philosophers), Thomas Aquinas developed Aristotle’s
account of the psyche in a number of ways. In Summa Theologiae,
written in the 13th century, he follows Aristotle in considering
the imagination to be one of several faculties, but (following the
Aristotelian-Arabic tradition of Avicenna and Averroës) divides
it into four ‘interior senses’: the sensus communis, which unifies
the stimuli of external senses, the imaginativa, which stores those
forms in order to re-compose them, the memorativa, which
stores those forms as they belong to the past, and the cogitativa,
which grasps the content of those forms (Aquinas, 1920, p. 78.4).
Aquinas also recognized the role of the brain in sensation, where
Aristotle believed that it served only to cool the blood (see Parts
of Animals II.7).
Together, these developments urged a model of imagining as
a corporeal activity. The inner senses, like the outer senses, have
bodily organs – and “the power of imagination has its action
impeded by damage to the organ [i.e., the brain] . . . as happens
to the phrenetic [literally, an individual with an inflamed brain]”
(Aquinas, 1920, 84.7 c23–24). The imagination’s corporeal nature
makes it epistemologically crucial, because the intellect has no
organ, and so must employ phantasms for understanding to
take place. “[E]veryone can experience within oneself,” claims
Aquinas, “that when one tries to understand something, one
forms certain phantasms for oneself by way of examples, in which
one examines, as it were, the thing one is striving to understand.
And so it is that when we wish to make someone else understand
a thing, we propose examples to him, through which he can
form phantasms for himself in order to understand” (Aquinas,
1920, 84.7 c37–43). Indeed, a damaged faculty of imagination
impedes the person “from actually understanding even the things
he has already acquired knowledge of” (Aquinas, 1920, 84.7
c34–36). Aquinas’s recognition both of the biological basis of
mental states (albeit excluding intellectual conception), and the
role of imagery in cognition, make his contribution to our history
an important one; we will pursue it further in our concluding
remarks (Figure 2).
Early Modern Philosophy
Aristotle’s emphasis on the importance of experience came
to the fore in the early modern tradition of empiricism. As
an epistemological position, empiricism’s central tenet is that
concepts originate in experience or derive from sensation, rather
than being innate. Historically, empiricism appears at many
points prior to its more familiar Enlightenment manifestations,
and several points after. From an initial reaction against Plato’s
rationalism by Stoicism and Epicureanism, an empiricist view of
knowledge – i.e., that there is nothing in the intellect that was not
previously in the senses – is held by most medieval philosophers.
Francis Bacon’s early modern formulation of the principles of
scientific induction, where priority is given to observation over
deductive reasoning, is a wholly empiricist move.
Although John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing (1690) stands as empiricism’s most elaborate
articulation, with its postulation of a ‘blank’ mind at birth
progressively filled by experience, David Hume’s systematic
development of Locke’s (and George Berkeley’s) positions in
his 1739 A Treatise of Human Nature is the more relevant
to our concerns (Locke, 1975). Hume’s is the most radically
empiricist view, holding that there are only experiences or
‘perceptions’, to an extent that there is no mind or self that
entertains them. The imagination, moreover, takes up a role that
is novel in its centrality: as the power that links ‘perceptions’
across time it almost comes to occupy the position left empty by
the metaphysical self. Before considering what this model of the
imagination entails for the act of imagining under investigation,
however, we should first sketch out his conception of thought in
general.
Hume begins his Treatise by calling all mental content,
everything of which a person is immediately aware, ‘perceptions’,
and goes on to claim that “[a]ll the perceptions of the human
mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall
call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. Those perceptions which enter
with most force and violence we may name impressions . . . By
ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning”
(Hume, 2003, 1.1.1.1). When we perceive, then, we are aware
of ‘impressions’, and when we think, we are aware of ‘ideas’.
The central claim here, however, with ramifications throughout
the Treatise, is that ideas are “faint images” of impressions. This
means that things imagined or conceived derive only from things
sensed, and are “nothing but copies and representations” (i.e.,
“re-presentations”) of them (the contrast with Plato, for whom
all images, whether mental or physical, are copies of things that
are themselves copies of divine eternal forms, is stark). The ideas,
moreover, are “faint”: indeed we find that they are distinguishable
from impressions only by the ‘vivacity’, or by the ‘force and
liveliness’, with which they ‘strike the mind’. “That idea of red,” for
example, “which we form in the dark and that impression which
strikes our eye in sunshine differ only in degree, not in nature”
(Hume, 2003, 1.1.1.5). The idea of a candle, similarly, is just a
dimmer, weaker, “faint[er] image” of the impression of a candle;
there is no intrinsic difference between a candle imagined and a
candle perceived.
Two faculties serve to re-present impressions to ourselves
as ideas: memory and imagination. Although remembered and
imagined ideas also differ in relative vivacity (the idea of a
past event “flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner”, an
imagined event appears “faint and languid”), remembered and
imagined ideas differ most fundamentally by their composition.
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FIGURE 2 | The Oculus Imaginationis (The Eye of the Imagination) as found on the title page of Tractatus One, Section Two, Portion Three of Robert
Fludd’s Ars Memoriae (Fludd, 1617).
Memory’s ideas are direct reproductions of impressions: “When
I shut my eyes and think of my study, the ideas I form are exact
representations of the impressions I felt when I was in my study;
every detail in one is to be found in the other” (Hume, 2003,
1.1.1.3). The imagination, however – and here the departure from
Aristotelian doctrine should be marked – “isn’t bound to keep the
same order and form as the original impressions had”, and may
produce ‘complex’ ideas by joining parts of several impressions
together. The imagination is at “liberty [to] transpose and change
its ideas”, as literary descriptions of mythical creatures suggest
(Hume, 2003, 1.1.4.5): I have never (and could never have) seen
a Pegasus, but I have seen horses, and I have seen wings, and
imagination combines them.
Although the imagination can “separate ideas and then
re-unite them in whatever form it pleases”, it does not do
so randomly. There are some “universal principles” – more
psychological regularities – that cause “bonds of union” to
form among ideas. Simple ideas, which are direct copies of
impressions, associate into complex ideas by resembling one
another, by being contiguous in time or space, or by standing in
relation of cause and effect. It is these principles of imaginative
association that allow our test subject to picture a complex idea,
as they respond to the instruction to see a candle.
To answer the question of how our participant is able to do
that, we must first answer the question of how they acquire the
Idea of a candle in the first place, and the answer is through
custom, or habit. Encountering groups of impressions enough
times – e.g., wax, wick, flame – leads the different instances to
be associated with one another. A name becomes associated with
that group of impressions via the principle of contiguity: the
word ‘candle’ is heard when the participant sees a short, white,
cylindrical, wax thing, when they see a tea light, and when looking
at a long, tapering, red thing (Broughton, 2000). Thus, “[w]hen
we have found a resemblance among several objects, that often
occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever
differences we may observe in the degrees of their quantity and
quality, and whatever other differences may appear among them”
(Hume, 2003, 1.1.7.7) After the participant has acquired a custom
of wax-wick-flame, the hearing of the name ‘candle’ “revives the
idea of one of these objects, and makes the imagination conceive
it with all its particular circumstances and proportions”: a candle
in general, but appearing to the participant as one of those candles
whose visual impression was contiguous in time with one of those
resembling auditory impressions (exactly how such a thought
can be functionally and semantically of a general candle, while
appearing to the thinker as a particular candle, it must be noted,
is never explained by Hume).
Meanwhile, that the idea of a candle is subjectively
differentiated from the impression of a candle according to their
relative vivacity – by a difference of degree – has a serious
consequence for our imagining participant. Because idea and
impression are the same kind of thing – i.e., perception –
and perceptions “succeed each other, and never all exist at the
same time” (Hume, 2003, 1.4.6.2), the imagined candle is not
something that interrupts the visual field or ‘superimposes itself’
over awareness of an exterior world. Being imagined grants the
candle no special status: the candle is merely one in a stream
of perceptions, some dimmer than others, that “successively
make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in
an infinite variety of postures and situations. . . .. They are the
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successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind” (Hume,
2003, 1.4.6.4). Further – and here the implications of such a
radical empiricism as Hume’s are most manifest – the perceptions
are not entertained by any subject: there is no consistent ‘self ’ that
perceives an imaginary candle, having perceived the instruction
to imagine one beforehand. It is the associative imagination that
autonomously impels the train of perceptions – and it is the
perceptions that constitute the mind.
Early Scientific Psychology
When applied to mental phenomena such as acts of imagining,
the experimental process – of making observations, gathering
data, and drawing implications for a prior hypothesis –
would seem to be obstructed at the first stage: other people’s
images are simply not available to observation, after all. Thus
scientific research into mental imagery begins with standardized
instructions to imagine, introspect and provide verbal accounts
of one’s imagery. Sir Francis Galton’s questionnaire on visualizing
and other allied activities – issued in November 1879, results
published in Mind in 1880 – was the first of these.
Galton’s primary interest was not visualizing itself, however.
Rather, the test examined the capacity to recollect a visual
scene as an index of the “peculiarities of the mental visions
of different persons”: its ultimate aim was to “elicit facts
that shall define the natural varieties of mental disposition in
the two sexes and in different races, and afford trustworthy
data as to the relative frequency with which different faculties
are inherited in different degrees” (Galton, 1880, p. 302). The
questionnaire was one of a number of means and methods Galton
devised for recording mental as well as physical characteristics
(sensory acuity, for example, as much as bodily proportions and
fingerprints) that would contribute to an understanding of the
determining effects of heredity. Wider investments aside, the
questionnaire provided a solution to the problem of how to
register, measure, and statistically analyze individual differences
in mental phenomena that was highly innovative – although
by no means unproblematic (as Schwitzgebel, 2011, for one
recent example, argues). It was distributed first to friends and
relatives, then to some schoolboys, then to 100 of Galton’s
male acquaintances, of whom a majority were “distinguished in
science or in other fields of intellectual work” (Galton, 1880,
p. 304). The questionnaire begins by asking the subjects to “think
of some definite object – suppose it is your breakfast-table
as you sat down to it this morning – and consider carefully
the picture that rises before your mind’s eye.” They are then
asked, “1. Illumination – Is the image dim or fairly clear? Is
its brightness comparable to that of the actual scene? . . . 2.
Definition – Are all the objects pretty well defined at the same
time, or is the place of sharpest definition at any one moment
more contracted than it is in the real scene?” (Galton, 1880,
p. 302) Consideration proceeds to “Color”, the “Extent of the field
of view”, “Distance of images”, and “Command over images”;
further questions enquire about instances of imagery in other
modalities.
The results, Galton found, displayed a wide variation. They
ranged from one respondent who claimed “I can see my breakfast
table or any equally familiar thing with my mind’s eye, quite
as well in all particulars as I can do if the reality is before
me”, to another who admitted, “My powers are zero. To my
consciousness there is almost no association of memory with
objective visual impressions. I recollect the breakfast table, but
do not see it” (Galton, 1880, p. 310).
Galton drew two main conclusions. One was that “scientific
men” as a class have feeble powers of visualization; this
was because “an over-readiness to perceive clear mental
pictures” is “antagonistic to the acquirement of habits of highly
generalized and abstract thought”. While Galton is an advocate
of visualizing – it should be “judiciously cultivated by as yet
undiscovered educational techniques” – the prejudices of the
age seem to be at play. Imagers and non-imagers are divided
by gender, class, and age: it is “women and intelligent children”
who have vivid imagery and are happy to describe it, while it
is “men who think hard” (the scientists) who do not think in
images. These claims have not been confirmed by later research,
20th- and 21st-century studies (Isaac and Marks, 1994; Brewer
and Schommer-Aikins, 2006) having failed to replicate his results.
Galton’s other main conclusion was that the study itself was
a success: it had “proved [the] facility of obtaining statistical
insight into the processes of other persons’ minds”. Indeed, “[t]he
conformity of replies from so many different sources... and the
evident effort made to give accurate answers, have convinced
me that it is a much easier matter than I had anticipated to
obtain trustworthy replies to psychological questions” Galton’s
(1883/1907, p. 60) confidence in introspection was born out as
experimental psychology developed in the latter part of the 19th
century – in the work of Wilhelm Wundt, Gustav Fechner, and
Hermann von Helmholtz – into a distinct academic discipline
based on the use of quantitative introspective methods. Whether
the replies to Galton’s questions were as “trustworthy” as he
thought, however, is another matter – which we will discuss
in Section “Challenges to a Scientific Engagement with Visual
Imagination” – and one that ultimately contributed to the demise
of introspectivist psychology.
Cognitive Science
Where, in the early 20th-century, introspectivist psychology had
fallen to behaviorism as the dominant approach, behaviorism’s
reign in turn came to an end in the 1960s, as cognitive psychology
developed models of underlying mental structures supported
by objective evidence. The behaviorist account was left wanting
by the demonstration of aspects of thought that functionally
depended on mental phenomena, and imagery in particular.
Alan Paivio’s (1963) work on memory was key in this regard.
His research showed that it was easier to remember concrete
nouns, such as ‘truck’ or ‘tree’, that can be imaged, than it is
to remember abstract nouns, such as ‘truth’ or ‘justice’, that
are difficult to image. Corroborated by self-reports provided by
research participants, the role of imagery as the effective mediator
of associative learning, and as an explanatory construct, was
established. Where Paivio’s work used memory tasks to suggest
the cognitive processes that their completion required, Shepard
and Metzler (1971) used ‘mental chronometry’: the measuring
of the amount of time taken to carry out various cognitive tasks.
Their ‘mental rotation’ experiment showed that the time taken to
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determine whether two rotated geometric figures were the same
or different corresponded linearly to the angle they needed to be
rotated to make the comparison. They interpreted the result as
showing that participants were mentally rotating one of the views
to see whether it matched the other.
If so, it seemed that mental imagery in itself was fundamental
to thought, that the ‘pictorial’ qualities of imagery could no longer
be regarded as epiphenomenal, in Stephen Kosslyn et al.’s (2006,
p. 6) striking simile, “like the heat thrown off by a lightbulb when
one reads (which plays no role in the reading process)”. Indeed
it was Stephen Kosslyn who became the main advocate of this
‘analog’ model, where internal representations share the same
format as external stimuli, being irreducibly images of what they
represent. Kosslyn himself had been lead to this position by the
results of ‘mental scanning’ experiments, which demonstrated
that the time it took to shift attention from one part of an imaged
object to another corresponded to the distance between those two
points on the physical object itself (Kosslyn et al., 1978). This
was taken to show that imagery shares the same mechanisms
as perception and that the internal representations involved in
imagining represent by being depictive, inasmuch as they are
spatially structured.
This was not, however, the only possible explanation of
these results. Pylyshyn (1981) accounted for them by appealing
to ‘tacit knowledge’: subjects in the experiments would have
unconsciously tried to emulate what they thought they would
have done in the corresponding perceptual situation, e.g., taking
more time to scan greater distances across the imagined object
(an explanation itself rejected on empirical grounds by Jolicoeur
and Kosslyn, 1985). Pylyshyn’s contrary interpretation made
up a part of a vociferous and long-running disagreement over
the nature of mental imagery. Around the same time that
Paivio, Kosslyn and others were developing their approaches,
advances in computing began to suggest computational models
and conceptions of human information processing. It is from the
perspective of computer science that Pylyshyn (1973, p. 1) refuted
explanations of experimental findings that relied on imagery,
and rejected outright the “picture metaphor” of visual mental
imagery. Instead, claimed Pylyshyn, mental imagery should be
understood to consist in “abstract mental structures to which
we do not have conscious access and which are essentially
conceptual and propositional, rather than pictorial, in nature.
Such representations are more accurately referred to as symbolic
descriptions than as images in the usual sense” (ibid.). More on
this ‘descriptionalist’ position below; for the moment it is enough
to say that the so-called ‘imagery debate’ ran until advances
in neuroimaging techniques in the late 20th-century provided
converging evidence that, for many (see Pearson and Kosslyn,
2015), confirmed the depictive model of imagery. Using PET,
Kosslyn et al. (1993) showed that when subjects perform visual
imagery tasks the occipital visual cortex is activated, analogously
to how it activates when objects are physically present. Key
to Kosslyn’s argument was the presentation of evidence (e.g.,
Slotnick et al., 2005) that visual imagery activates ‘retinotopic’
visual cortices that preserve the spatial layout of the retina.
In perception, this means that the pattern of light stimulating
the retina will be repeated there as activation; in visual mental
imagery, it means that there will be a correspondence between
the spatial form of the mental image and the spatial pattern
of neural activity. This is evidence, according to Kosslyn, that
“imagery relies on representations that depict information, not
describe it” – conclusive evidence, in other words, “that mental
imagery relies on actual images” (Kosslyn et al., 2001, p. 639).
Although Pylyshyn (2003) in the early 2000s continued to
reject Kosslyn’s interpretation – arguing that mental images
and topographical patterns of activation in the early visual
cortex do not convincingly correspond more recent findings,
that, for example, rely on machine learning algorithms using
patterns of activation in the early visual cortex to reconstruct
what is being visualized (Naselaris et al., 2015), would seem
to make the ‘analog’ model of mental imagery very difficult to
refute.
What was at stake for cognitive science in the visualizing of a
candle, then, were fundamentally opposed theories of the mind’s
operation. Is the candle in the test-subject’s ‘mind’s eye’ there as
an epiphenomenal side-effect of his mind’s essentially computer-
like operation, or is it an instantiation of the very medium
through which he thinks? The findings of cognitive science and
the analyses of philosophy have interlaced over such questions.
We will now turn to the philosophers’ interventions.
Analytic Philosophy
What has recent philosophy made of our test-subject picturing a
candle? By way of an answer, we will look firstly at philosophical
responses to the debate in cognitive science that we have just
encountered, over the representational format of imagery. We
will then discuss a related attempt to sharpen the concept of
imagery itself – specifically, asking if imagery is necessarily
‘experiential’ – before suggesting how the two lines of enquiry
align with fundamentally opposed positions on the nature of
mental imagery.
Following Michael Tye, we can distinguish three philosophical
views emerging in response to the kind of theory about mental
images that Aristotle and the British Empiricists, and latterly
Stephen Kosslyn, put forth (i.e., that they are essentially picture-
like, and represent by being so). One is the behaviorist view,
which we will discuss in more detail in Section “Challenges to a
Scientific Engagement with Visual Imagination”, below; another
is ‘Adverbial Theory’, proposed by Tye himself. From comparative
semantic analyses of phrases about mental images, Adverbial
Theory concludes that, ultimately, there are none. Grammatical
similarity between statements such as “the subject has an image
of a candle” and “the subject has a candle” would suggest a logical
similarity – that the subject can have an image of a candle, just as
she can have a candle. But the similarity breaks down into serious
problems. Can two persons have one and the same image (like
they can a candle)? If they cannot, and mental images are not
the kind of things than can be ‘had’, are they then nonphysical?
And if mental images are nonphysical objects, then “how did they
emerge in the evolution of matter?” (Dennett, 1991, p. 29). Such
conundrums suggest to Tye that philosophers have been misled
by the grammar of ordinary language, assuming grammatical
form indicates logical form, to the false conception that there are
images to be ‘had’.
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The third view is ‘descriptionalism’. Zenon Pylyshyn is the
principal exponent in cognitive science; philosophers advancing
a descriptionalist account of imagery include J. M. Shorter and
Daniel Dennett. The central claim is that mental images represent
objects in the same way that linguistic descriptions represent
objects. As Tye points out, this does not mean that during
imagery spoken language is in some way present in the imager’s
mind; rather, the claim is about the way the phenomenon of
mental imagery gets encoded in the brain, that mental images’
“neural code . . . is, in some important respects, language-like”
(Dennett, 1991, p. 27). So mental images are not a special form of
picture-like, depictive thought. Indeed, Sterelny (1986) suggests
philosophical descriptionalism may be partly motivated by a
desire for a unified model of the mind: if other propositional
attitudes like memory, belief, and desire are best understood as
being structurally sentence-like, a linguistic account of mental
images forms a more coherent approach. Moreover, according to
its advocates, descriptionalism explains characteristics of mental
imagery that are a challenge to accounts of mental images that
figure them as inner pictures. Indeterminacy, for example. As
both Shorter (1952) and Dennett (1969) point out, descriptions
often leave things unspecified: I may say that there is a candle
in front of me, for example, without specifying whether or not
the wick is lit. When mental images are “noncommittal” in this
way – my visualization of a candle is still of a candle without
it specifying whether the wick is lit or not – it would seem that
representation via description can account for the indeterminacy.
Elsewhere, Dennett (1991, p. 55) observes that “[d]ifferent
listener’s phenomenology in response to the same utterance can
vary almost ad infinitum without any apparent variation in
comprehension or uptake”. Considering the variation in mental
imagery that might be provoked in two people who hear the
sentence ‘Yesterday my uncle fired his lawyer’, Dennett finds that
comprehension or ‘uptake’, as could be confirmed by subsequent
paraphrasing and responses to questioning, remains determinate;
the mental image is contingent, and thus epiphenomenal as far
as understanding is concerned (Plato’s painter in the soul merely
illustrating the scribe’s discursive train of thought is the distant
antecedent here).
A related question that recent philosophy asks of our putative
image of a candle is whether or not it is ‘experiential’. For
Christopher Peacocke all sensory imagining (i.e., involving
imagery) is experiential, in that when one imagines a candle,
one is imagining the experience of perceiving a candle, not a
candle on its own. As Peacocke (1985, pp. 22–23) puts it, “If
S sensorily imagines an F . . . then S sensorily imagines from
the inside perceptually experiencing an F . . . in the imaginary
world. Martin (2003, p. 403) calls this the Dependency Thesis,
and, following Peacocke, argues that sensory imagining – “those
distinctive episodes of imagining or imaging which correspond to
our use of the distinct senses” – is necessarily imagining sensing.
By representing a candle, Martin claims, mental imagery inherits
the phenomenal properties of experiencing a candle (Martin,
2003, p. 406). The dependency (of imagination on perception)
explains the way that visualizing is perspectival: that I seem
to only be able to picture a candle from a certain point in
space in relation to the candle is due to perceptions being
from certain points in space, and imaginings being imagined
perceptions.
Peacocke and Martin’s thesis is directly challenged by Paul
Noordhof, who accounts for the fact that mental images always
represent their objects from a certain perspective by appealing
to what he calls the Similar Content Hypothesis. This holds that
perceptions have contents, which are the features of an object
conveyed to the subject by perceiving it – i.e., the candle’s white
wax, its height of around 20 cm, its wick aflame – and that
these will be similar to equivalent modes of sensory imagining.
An imagining of a candle combines the content with a possible
point of view drawn from our knowledge of egocentric space, a
“supposition’ (Noordhof, 2002, p. 439) that the imagined candle
is presented relative to a single viewpoint. The candle, concludes
Noordhof, is visualized from a certain imaginary point not
because the subject is in some way aping perceiving a candle but
because the visualization is informed by extra-visual knowledge
of how things look in relation to oneself; thus imagining a candle
does not need or ‘depend’ on perception.
We can see that Noordhof ’s view on whether sensory
imagining is imagined sensing has essential correlations with
the descriptionalist view of mental images: both hold that
visual mental imagery is underwritten by information that is
not itself in a visual format, whether it be Pylyshyn’s ‘tacit
knowledge’, a language-like neural code, or a combination of
‘supposition’ and ‘content’ (which itself amounts to a kind
of ‘appearance report’). Conversely, Peacocke and Martin’s
dependency thesis about sensory imagining entails, like the
‘depictive’ account of mental imagery’s representational format,
a direct relationship with perception. According to Martin,
one’s mental image of a certain object is of that object
because it inherits the phenomenal properties of perceiving
such an object; integral to Kosslyn’s account of mental
imagery is the neuroscientific finding that visualizing utilizes –
depends on – visual perception’s physiological apparatus. And,
to continue the knowledge-perception opposition, we might
counter Dennett’s descriptionalist explanation of imagery’s
representational indeterminacy with the simple observation that
mental images can be vague, just like percepts can. We will
see in the next section which side of the knowledge-perception
opposition most challenges the scientific investigation of imagery.
CHALLENGES TO A SCIENTIFIC
ENGAGEMENT WITH VISUAL
IMAGINATION
Behaviorist Psychology
The primary conceptual and methodological challenge to
scientific work on imagining comes from the behaviorist
movement in psychology and philosophy that flourished in
the first half of the 20th-century – but also from associated,
‘behavioristic’ attitudes and conceptions that have continued into
the present.
Behaviorism, at least in its historical form, rejects outright
imagining and mental images as objects of scientific study.
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“Psychology as the behaviorist views it”, ran Watson’s (1913)
manifesto article, “is a purely objective experimental branch
of natural science.” Psychology deluded itself in thinking it
had made mental states the object of observation. As far
as Watson was concerned, psychology should no longer be
conducted in terms of “consciousness, mental states, mind,
content, introspectively verifiable imagery, and the like”; instead,
it should be done in terms of “stimulus and response, in terms
of habit formation, habit integrations and the like” (Watson,
1913, p. 160). The manifesto dedicates a lengthy footnote to
the problem of mental imagery, or as Watson calls it, “centrally
aroused visual sensations”, where it is hypothesized that all of
the “so-called ‘higher thought’ processes” (including imagery)
are in fact “faint reinstatements of the original muscular act”,
occurring as “motor habits in the larynx”. As 1928’s The Ways
of Behaviorism reiterates, when a person “closes his eyes” and
says “I see the house where I was born, the trundle bed in
my mother’s room where I used to sleep – I can even see my
mother as she comes to tuck me in”, that person is “merely
dramatizing”: the behaviorist “finds no proof of imagery in all
this. We have put all these things in words, long, long ago”
(Watson, 1928, pp. 76–77). On Watson’s (1928) view, then,
not only is imagery not a proper object for scientific enquiry,
but ‘first-person’ reports of the experience of it are invalid too.
According to Watson, when we think we are imagining or
picturing a certain scene we are in fact having “a conversation
about [it] either to ourselves (thought)” – (potentially) observable
as tiny “subvocal” movements of the throat – “or with some one
else (talk)” (ibid.). Later versions of behaviorism – specifically
Skinner’s (1953) – were more lenient regarding imagery: it could
be granted existence, but only as a form of deeply hidden,
effectively unobservable, covert behavior. If Skinner’s constitutes
a psychological behaviorism – that attempts to explain all behavior
in terms of stimuli, responses, and so on – and Watson’s
constitutes a methodological behaviorism – a normative theory
about the conduct of psychology, where private mental states
do not form proper objects of empirical study – there remains
an analytical or logical behaviorism, exhibited by the mid-
20th-century philosophy of Gilbert Ryle and the later Ludwig
Wittgenstein.
Analytical Behaviorism
Ryle and Wittgenstein’s behaviorism is really an effect of the
application of their particular ‘ordinary language’ approach to
philosophy of mind. The central contention of ordinary language
philosophy is that language is the means by which “thinking
goes public” (Brann, 1991, p. 156). Consequently, philosophical
analysis consists of examining not immediate experience (as
is the case in, for example, the phenomenological tradition)
but the ways in which language is used, and specifically the
ways in which mental phenomena are commonly spoken about.
Ryle’s (1949) The Concept of Mind takes common expressions
of consciousness experience – like ‘seeing with the mind’s eye’ –
to indicate an erroneous belief in what amounts to a “ghost in
the machine”. Wittgenstein’s (1953) Philosophical Investigations
is more circumspect: there is not the active repudiation of mental
events or processes, but rather a disinclination to credit them with
explanatory power. Consequently Wittgenstein is not concerned
with the experience of imagining: “[w]e are not analyzing a
phenomenon (e.g., thought) but a concept (e.g., thinking) and
therefore the use of a word” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 383). When
analyzing a concept such as imagination it does not help to
“point” to any particular experience of it – this would make us
expect “a wrong kind of answer” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 370).
But as much as Wittgenstein moves the object of analysis from
phenomenon to concept, he also wants to minimize the import
of the phenomenon itself, not least in the case of comprehension:
“It is no more essential to the understanding of a proposition that
one should imagine anything in connection with it, than that one
should make a sketch from it” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 396). The
point seems to be that being a mental process grants imagining
or imaging no special status – it could be substituted with a
sketch or indeed a verbal description of what is imaged. Hence
there is first-person authority in respect of mental images – we
can only know what is being imagined by what the imaginer
reports – because the ‘interior’, mental aspect is elided into the
report. “Suppose”, writes Wittgenstein, “that someone were to
draw while he had an image, or instead of having it, though it were
only with his finger in the air. He could be asked “Whom does
that represent?” And his answer would be decisive. It is quite as if
he had given a verbal description: and such a description can also
simply take the place of the image” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 177e).
Logically, the image on its own, whether drawn or imagined,
is ambiguous – it takes a description to identify it, which in
turn makes the image itself redundant (note the connection with
Paul Noordhof ’s supplementary “supposition”, the non-visual
knowledge that the visualization relies on). On a psychological
level, the consequence is not just that attention is focused on the
expression of what one imagines, but that the mental image is
taken to coincide with that expression, rather than be a private
entity which is then described: the description can take the place
of the image.
If Wittgenstein’s account constitutes an attack on the
imagination, or mental imagery at least, Gilbert Ryle’s account
is “demolitionist” (Warnock, 1976, p. 153). The locus of Ryle’s
assault is Chapter VIII of The Concept of Mind (1949), where it
is the notion of mental images – discreet copies of things once
seen – as existing somehow ‘in’ the mind, which is rejected. As
Ryle puts it: “the familiar truth that people are constantly seeing
things in their minds’ eyes and hearing things in their heads
is no proof that there exist things which they see and hear, or
that the people are seeing or hearing” (Ryle, 1949, p. 222). Just
as a murder performed on stage in a theater has no victim and
is not a murder, “so seeing things in one’s mind’s eye does not
involve either the existence of things seen or the occurrence of
acts of seeing them” (Ryle, 1949, p. 223). Ryle’s claim can be
best understood as a rejection of both Cartesian dualism, with its
necessary implication that mental processes or events are played
out in a ‘private theater’, and – especially in this case – Hume’s
empiricist epistemology. Because seeing in the mind’s eye is not
seeing at all, it makes no sense to speak of it being on a continuum
of “vivacity” with visual perception; thus, “[t]o say that an action
is a mock-murder is to say, not that a certain sort of mild or
faint murder has been committed, but that no sort of murder
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has been committed” (Ryle, 1949, p. 228). Ultimately – again
undermining the ‘seeing things’ model of imagining, as Ryle calls
it – to imagine x is merely “one among many ways of utilizing
[my] knowledge” of x. Seeing an object in my mind’s eye is one of
the things which my knowledge of that object enables me to do:
“describing it in words is another and a rarer ability; recognizing
it at sight in the flesh is the commonest of all” (Ryle, 1949,
p. 242).
Wittgensteinian Critique
The methods and tenets of ‘ordinary language’ philosophy
have been applied recently to cognitive neuroscience. Bennett
and Hacker’s (2003) Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience
sets about a conceptual critique of cognitive neuroscience’s
methods and claims. Like Ryle, their object of attack is Cartesian
dualism, but in this case it is the dualism of neuroscience
when it commits the ‘mereological fallacy’: ascribing to
parts of humans properties that make sense to predicate
only of whole humans, i.e., “the brain sees” and “the left
hemisphere thinks”. “Human beings, but not their brains,
can be said to be thoughtful or thoughtless” (Bennett and
Hacker, 2003, p. 73). The problem with cognitive neuroscientists
construing brains and brain hemispheres as believing, perceiving,
imagining, and so forth, is that such constructions prevent an
understanding of human behavior any better than “construing
clock cogs as giving the time allows us to understand clock
behavior” (Burgos and Donahoe, 2006, p. 75) – and ultimately
lead to meaningless research presuppositions, justifications, and
interpretations.
Hacker and Bennett’s analysis of cognitive neuroscience’s
claims includes those made about notions of the imagination:
its relation with creativity, perception, belief, and the place of
‘mental imagery’ in its conceptualization. The points made there
are largely recognizable from Ryle and Wittgenstein: mental
images are a major source of conceptual confusion because,
contrary to common parlance, we do not in fact “have” them
(because they are not things that can be possessed); they need not
be involved in imagining; and, reiterating their refutation of the
mereological fallacy, the brain does not ‘have’ imagination. The
same logic undermines foundational psychological treatments
of mental imagery. Francis Galton’s (1880) questionnaire on
visualizing and other allied faculties is predicated, say Hacker
and Bennett, on the false belief that mental images are objects
‘in’ the mind, available for inspection. Shepard and Metzler’s
(1971) mental rotation task, similarly, does not stand as ‘evidence’
for mental imagery. For Hacker and Bennett, the problem is
not only that such evidence for mental imagery is indirect –
mental images are not being measured or detected in any way –
but that indirect evidence is no evidence at all. Neuroscientific
claims to identify the neural concomitants of mental states are
similarly dismissed: such concomitants are ‘merely’ inductive
evidence. The only criterion for whether someone has a visual
image of something, Bennett and Hacker conclude, reiterating
Wittgenstein’s claim of first-person authority in respect of mental
images, “is that he says that he has and can say how he
visualizes what he imagines” (Bennett and Hacker, 2003, p. 180)
(Figure 3).
FOUNDATIONS, CHALLENGES,
INSIGHTS, AND REFLECTIONS
Foundations
The study of visual imagery in contemporary cognitive
neuroscience belongs to a long tradition in natural philosophy;
indeed, the neuroscientific work can even be seen as a
technologically sophisticated empirical turn in that lineage. The
intellectual history that creates the conditions for the scientific
endeavor does so in two main ways. Firstly, its attitude to visual
imagination grants it an observable ‘reality’ and a central function
in cognition. Aristotle’s understanding of phantasia, the capacity
that enables us to visualize things in their absence; Hume’s
account of ‘ideas’ as faint copies of impressions; Galton’s early
measurements of the vividness of imagery; Paivio’s exploration
of the relationship between imageability and memorability;
Shepard’s demonstration that manipulations of imagery mirror
manipulations of the items they represent; Kosslyn’s depictive
theory of imagery all, in their conceptual affirmation of visual
mental imagery, prepare the ground for the empirical study of its
neural correlates.
Secondly, these historical moments – particularly the earlier
ones – inform and anticipate a distinctly scientific approach to
visual mental imagery. Aristotle’s conviction that ultimate reality
lay in the physical world, knowable through experience, is the
primordial example. It makes possible a science or epistêmê that
begins in sense perception and builds up to an understanding of
the necessary and invariant features of the world. At the same
time, Aristotle admits a fundamental uncertainty about how to
study the soul. Does it belong to ‘natural science’ (i.e., physics) –
since various psychological states, including anger, pity, love,
and hate, all involve the body in obvious ways? (Aristotle, 1984,
403a16–28) – or, considering that the ‘higher’ processes of mind
or nous do not seem to involve the body to the same extent, is
a natural scientist inadequate to the study of the soul (Aristotle,
1984, 1026a4–6)? The uncertainty echoes through the history
(and pre-history) of psychology.
There is an irony in imagination’s being given such a pivotal
role in David Hume’s epistemology: the Treatise is to no small
extent motivated by a desire to correct the imagination’s undue
influence on philosophy. It is the imagination, claims Hume,
that begets ‘unscientific’ metaphysical systems and the ‘fancy’ that
suggests hypotheses about worlds beyond that of experience; the
ancient philosophers are disparaged for being seduced by “every
trivial propensity of the imagination” (Hume, 2003, 1.4.3.11). As
the introduction makes clear, the Treatise is directly intended to
constrain metaphysics in order to make way for a “science of
man” – namely, an investigation into human psychology on a
solely empirical basis – and rein in the imagination accordingly.
Francis Galton’s technique for making mental phenomena
available to measurement and statistical analysis could be said
to make good on Hume’s promise. It proved to be influential on
many levels, not least by its several (more readily quantifiable)
progeny, including Betts’s (1909) ‘Questionnaire upon Mental
Imagery’, Gordon’s (1949) ‘Test of Visual Imagery Control’,
and Marks’s (1973) Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire
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FIGURE 3 | Table of “iconophile” positions, that provide the foundations for neuroscientific engagement with mental imagery, and “iconophobic”
positions, that challenge it.
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(VVIQ). And while behavioral techniques such as mental rotation
have done more to confirm the ‘reality’ of imagery, Galton’s
questionnaire stands as the first attempt to overcome the
methodological problems caused by imagery’s inherently private
nature. In confirming the visualized candle, for example, as an
entity whose values of “Illumination . . . Definition . . . [and]
Coloring” reveal themselves on scrutiny, it affirms that such acts
of imagination are amenable to scientific analysis: the visualized
candle can be observed, the observations can be articulated and
treated as data to be systematically gathered, implications can be
extracted.
Challenges
As we have seen, some historical thinkers have questioned the
role of imagery in cognition and cast doubt on the feasibility
of studying this salient but elusive aspect of our experience.
Behaviorism, in its psychological, methodological and analytical
forms, holds that experience per se is not an appropriate target
for science. Hacker and Bennett, more specifically, argue that
work seeking the neural basis of psychological function in the
functioning of the brain commits a logical fallacy – hunting for
an explanation in small parts of the body for functions that
properly belong to the whole. Pylylshyn and the philosophical
‘descriptionalists’ have questioned whether ‘thinking in pictures’
has any special status, arguing that every kind of thought is
fundamentally abstract or propositional. How destructive are
these ‘iconophobic’ challenges to contemporary imagery science?
While the measurement of behavior is at the heart of scientific
psychology, the renaissance of interest in consciousness over
the past several decades reflects the failure of proponents of
behaviorism to persuade the intellectual community that talk
of ‘experience’ is no more than a redescription of behavior.
John Searle’s terse remark that such theories ‘have left out
the mind’ strikes many readers as apposite. The fundamental
nature of ‘experience’ remains mysterious and controversial,
but the successful exploration of its neural correlates reinforces
the everyday intuition that our ‘inner lives’ are rich and real,
and undermines philosophical arguments (like Wittgenstein’s,
Ryle’s, or Tye’s) that dispute the reality of our inner lives on
the basis of the language by which they are commonly spoken
about. It is highly probable that visual imagery depends on brain
regions which are also used in visual perception, pointing to
a distinctively depictive mode of mental representation. This is
not to deny the possibility of important commonalties, at neural
and computational levels, between all forms of representation in
the brain (as current computational models indeed hold – for
example Eliasmith’s (2013), where the mechanisms that underlie
multiple cognitive functions are sought).
Meanwhile the ‘mereological fallacy’ does not appear to be
a major barrier to continuing research: people, not brains, it
is true, see, remember and imagine, but some parts of people,
and not other parts, are crucial to these functions. Refining our
understanding of the biological basis of experience, by probing
these relationships, commits no logical fallacy. It seems to us
that, following the commentator’s analogy, one should indeed
examine the cogs of a clock in order to understand how it gives
the time.
Bennett and Hacker’s claim, that the only criterion for
whether someone has a visual image “is that he says that he
has”, would seem to be rendered untenable by such powerful
demonstrations of imagery’s biological basis as the ability to
use fMRI-measured activation patterns to reconstruct what a
person is visualizing (Naselaris et al., 2015). Ultimately, the
‘iconophobic’ positions we have described – besides appearing,
often as not, as attempts to explain post-hoc empirical results
produced by ‘iconophilic’ researchers – seem unable to withstand
neuroscientific engagement.
Insights
The philosophical history we have reviewed points to the richness
and complexity of the concept – and the activity – of imagining.
Following the lead of many recent researchers, we have focussed
in this paper on the task of visualization, the formation of an
image of an object in its absence. This relatively simple task
is massively intricate in neural terms, and we still have much
to learn about its neural basis. But ‘imagination’ can engage
other senses than vision, and other modes of brain function
than sensation, as in motor imagery; occur in propositional as
well as sensory forms; involve creativity; allow the contemplation
of possible worlds. Scientists hoping to plumb the depths of
imagination will need to take account of this richness and
complexity which may be most fully revealed in a literature that
neuroscientists – understandably – seldom consult.
Reflections on the ‘Prehistory’ in the
Light of Imagery Science
Throughout much of the history of thought, ‘philosophy’
included areas of knowledge that we currently assign to science.
Reviewing the thoughts of Aristotle, Aquinas, or Hume on the
imagination, it seems likely that they would have been fascinated
and delighted by contemporary research in neuroscience. They
were early psychologists: their models were concerned as much
with empirical as with conceptual aspects of the mind. To some
extent, therefore, the contemporary neuroscience of imagery is
the natural heir of a philosophical tradition; indeed, the findings
of imagery science, and the theories built around them, make
several moments in its prehistory strikingly prescient.
That imagery shares processing mechanisms with like-
modality perception, and that visual mental imagery has been
conceptualized as a weak or ‘noisy’ form of top–down perception
(Pearson et al., 2015), echoes Hume’s conviction that there
is no intrinsic difference between something imagined and
something perceived, and that ‘ideas’ are distinguishable from
‘impressions’ by the lesser ‘vivacity’ or ‘force and liveliness’
with which they ‘strike the mind’. Aquinas’s (1920, 84.7 c34–
36) observation that “the power of imagination” is “impeded
by damage to [the brain]”, which impedes in turn the person
from “understanding even the things he has already acquired
knowledge of” would seem to anticipate such cases as reported
by Brain (1954) and Zeman et al. (2010), where stroke or head
injury precedes sudden loss of the ability to summon visual
imagery, even of familiar routes or faces. And contemporary
theories of ‘embodied’ cognition, which propose that all forms
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of cognition involve modality-specific mental simulations, and
imply that imagery plays a functional role in all cognitive events,
give the Aristotelian tenet that "the soul never thinks without a
phantasma" [Aristotle, 1984, 431a] a fresh pertinence.
Such connections play out in support of the actuality and
relevance of mental imagery. As we have seen, however, there
have always been ‘imagery skeptics’, thinkers who have doubted
that imagery plays any real or important or measurable role
in our mental lives. The stark opposition between the views
of imagery enthusiasts and imagery denigrators raises the
question of whether these two groups of thinkers may have
been working, in some sense, with different data. Reisberg
et al. (2003) have shown that the views of participants in the
‘imagery debate’ were influenced by the vividness of their own
imagery: those with vivid imagery were more sympathetic to
the view the imagery is picture-like, and more likely to judge
imagery worthy of further research. We wonder if, as Berman
(2008) suggests, something similar may apply to the differing
perspectives of philosophers of imagery whose views may also
have been influenced by their varying, personal experiences
of imagery. The centrality of imagination in David Hume’s
epistemology, alongside his report that when he shut his eyes
and thought of his study, the “ideas” he formed were “exact
representations of the impressions [he] felt when [he] was
in [his] study” (Reisberg et al., 2003, 1.1.1.3), are a case in
point.
If, as Tye (1991) argues, pre-scientific thinkers have been over-
reliant on their subjective experience, the great benefit of science
is that it can confront subjective impression with objective fact.
To a striking degree, contemporary cognitive neuroscience is
finding objective, neural correlates for both robust and more
elusive aspects of our experience – for example, our experience of
illusion (Zeki et al., 1993), of hallucination (Ffytche et al., 1998),
even of shivers down the spine (Blood and Zatorre, 2001). Unlike
Aristotle, Hume or even Watson and Wittgenstein, we are in a
position to triangulate experience, behavior and biology, linking
the experience of imagery to measurable aspects of behavior and
processes in the brain. We hope that this paper will help to
make this triangulation a worthy continuation of the long and
fascinating history of thought about the ubiquitous experience of
imagery.
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